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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the way in which institutional learning has been adopted by
a post-harvest technology research project in India to cope with the institutional con-
straints associated with various public agencies, as well as to help formulate broader
lessons for institutional reform in horticultural R&D systems. The case study presents
an institutional history of public and private efforts to assist farmers from the Vijaya
Association of Fruit and Vegetable Growers’ Cooperative Societies of Andhra Pradesh
to produce and sell export quality mangoes. Problems in the relationships between
stakeholders reveal the need to see technology development projects in a much more
holistic light than is conventionally understood.
Introduction
This paper is about the need for institutional learning in agricultural science
research projects. Its underlying message is that while technology development
(and transfer) is certainly key to sustainable development, it will only succeed if
the institutional context is appropriate. It has been written in response to an
implicit (and still widely held) belief that it is possible to think of development
projects as purely technical activities. The corollary is that implementation of
results is then something that can simply be left to other agencies or the market.
Such rationalisation fits neatly into an organisational context where professional
identities can be maintained and promoted. The problem is that it is almost cer-
tainly highly inefficient in the normal economic sense. There are simply too
many examples of technical projects producing outputs that sit on shelves, inac-
cessible to the range of stakeholders that might in better circumstances have
been able to make productive use of them. Conversely, where institutional learn-
ing is allowed to occur it is likely that there could be significant improvement in
the value added to technical projects.
The Vijaya mango export project discussed in this paper is a case study of
precisely this phenomenon; a technical and policy study of recent developments
in the mango sub-sector of the Indian economy involving an institutional mar-
keting innovation, the Vijaya Association of Fruit and Vegetable Growers’ Co-
operative Societies of Andhra Pradesh (Vijaya). Conceived initially as a purely
technical series of projects and interventions, it gradually became clear that the
issues were equally about institutions and the need for institutional change.
Thus what is interesting about the Vijaya case is not so much its success in inte-
grating small farmers into a wider economic market (including the high-value
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export market) but rather Vijaya’s relationships with other stakeholders, in par-
ticular those that have been potential sources of technology. Problems in these
relationships reveal the need to see technology transfer in a much more holistic
light than is conventionally understood. And the relative failure of public-sector
technology sources also indicates the need for associated policy reforms that
again have an institutional dimension. 
In the case studies described here, an external research institute was
brought in from overseas to assist with a technology problem that the local sci-
entific infrastructure was apparently having difficulty resolving. The external
body, however, still saw the hiatus as a technical one initially, and it was only
as time went by that the importance of the institutional dimension became
clear. From that point a degree of institutional learning began to take place.
First was the realisation on the part of the marketing association, and to a lesser
extent the export development authority, that better mechanisms were needed
to link farmers to public-sector technology sources, and that the technical
outputs needed to be made relevant.
Second was the institutional learning on the part of the project, as well as
on part of the donor funding the series of studies. In the final phase the institu-
tional roles within the project changed significantly. The project no longer
focused primarily on technical solutions. Instead, it addressed ways of strength-
ening institutional processes and linkages to ensure that the private marketing
association, Vijaya, and the farmers it represents, was better integrated with
public-sector sources of science and technology and related services. Further
cycles of institutional learning are still required on the part of all the stakehold-
ers involved.
Institutional learning is key to the success of continuing efforts of public
agencies to help farmers take better advantage of new markets. While export
success has yet to be achieved, this case study has important implications for
the types of donor-funded research projects that are likely to be of assistance in
the future. In addition to generating and reporting technological findings, pro-
jects must also address and generate knowledge on the processes associated with
technology development and delivery systems. The conclusion therefore must be
that if an institutional perspective is built into projects at an early stage, the-
likelihood of successful interventions becomes much greater.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. The next section pro-
vides a very brief introduction to the concept of institutional learning and the
importance that is given to this in current policy analysis and debate about
innovation systems. The third section provides background orientation, describ-
ing the general institutional environment of public-sector agencies allied to hor-
ticultural R&D and export market development, elaborating the role and capa-
bilities of the key agencies relevant to the case study. The fourth section presents
the case study. This describes an institutional history of attempts to support
farmers’ entry into mango export markets and the interlocking and evolving
roles of Vijaya, the project and Indian public agencies in this process. The dis-
cussion in section five elaborates the implications of the case study. In particu-
lar, the implications of the systems nature of the technical and economic issues
being addressed and the need to conceptualise interventions and associated insti-
tutional arrangements in a similar systems framework. The final section draws
conclusions for international research policy for developing countries.
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Institutional Learning
The recognition of the importance of institutional learning is rooted in contem-
porary policy analysis of the innovation process and its performance. A common
theme has been the conceptualisation of innovation in systemic terms, where
institutions act as nodes in the production and application of new knowledge. In
the context of agriculture, a widely cited example of this is Biggs’ discussion of a
‘multiple sources of innovation’ model in agriculture (1990). However, institu-
tional learning has received much more attention in the context of industrial
production in developed economies. Here the systemic idea of a national system
of innovation (NSI) (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992) and related conceptual
frameworks have made considerable progress in understanding the innovation
process and how to plan and manage it1.
The contribution of NSI is that it provides a way of analysing institutional
roles and relationships, and the way these change over time. This is conceptu-
alised in terms of an innovation system. This type of analysis is more inclusive
than the narrower notion of a research system, the distinction being that the
latter is a system of predominantly public-sector organisations engaged in pro-
ducing technical innovations. In contrast, an innovation system encompasses all
the elements of the system or network of private and public sector institutions
whose interactions produce, diffuse and use economically useful knowledge.
Unlike research systems, innovation systems are viewed as producing both tech-
nological and institutional innovations. It is in relation to the latter that institu-
tional learning is so important. It underpins the evolutionary dynamic that often
creates the new institutional forms that allow the development and utilisation of
new technology. This process of institutional learning is a central feature of suc-
cessful innovation systems.
The application of the NSI framework in the agricultural research sector is
starting to gain ground (Hall et al., 1998; 2000; 2001 in press a & b; Clark,
2001 in press; Ekboir and Parellada, 2001, in press)2. The associated debate has
two very simple, although rarely applied lessons for agricultural research pro-
jects3. Firstly, technological constraints can neither be conceived nor addressed
without reference to the institutional context in which they are embedded. This
means that consideration needs to be given to the range of institutions involved
in research and technology application. Specifically, consideration needs to be
given to the way the attributes, characteristics, norms and agendas of these
institutions are likely to influence research outcomes, as well as access to and
application of new technology. Secondly, since R&D and technology application
is so intimately bound up with this institutional context, the institutional inno-
vations that are necessary to produce and use technology in new ways are
equally valid and important ‘scientific’ outputs. It is these outputs and the insti-
tutional learning opportunities that they represent, that are so often forgotten in
agricultural research projects.
Another way of making the same point, and one which is now mainstream
in innovation systems thinking, is to recognise that new technology, (and
attempts to generate and apply it), has no meaning unless it is considered in an
institutional context. This has profound implications for traditional technology
research projects. The remainder of this paper demonstrates the practical impor-
tance of recognising the institutional context and the potential role institutional
1 Edquist (1997)
provides substantial
discussion on the pre-
cise definition of
national systems of
innovation and differ-
ent ways authors
have interpreted the
concept and its short-
comings. Carlson
(1995) discusses a
similar concept using
the term ‘technologi-
cal systems’. See also
Clark (2001, in press)
for a treatment that
stresses formal
information theory. 
2 In fact other earlier
analysis of
agricultural research
systems has been
couched in terms very
similar to the NSI
approach. Biggs’
(1990) discussion of a
multiple source of
innovation model of
agricultural research
and technology
promotion is a notable
example of this.
However more
recently, the new
NARS model discussed
by Byerlee and Alex
(1998) develops a
similar theme. The
discussion of an inter-
acting matrix of
sources of funds and
research organisation
(Echeverria 1998;
Byerlee, 1998) implic-
itly makes the same
point. 
3 Clark and Clay (1986)
present a good exam-
ple of this in their
discussion of the
Indore Dry Land
Farming project in
India. The project was
generally seen as only
moderately successful
from a technical point
of view. But Clark and
Clay recognised that
where the project had
23Institutional Learning in Technical Projects
learning can have in dealing with the constraints and opportunities contained
within institutional contexts.
The case study presented in this paper is an institutional history of public
and private stakeholder efforts to assist Indian farmers to produce and sell
export-quality mangoes. This concerns the way Vijaya sought the assistance of
public agencies in India such as the Agricultural and Processed Food Products
Export Development Authority (APEDA), who in turn facilitated Vijaya’s access
to both local and international sources of technical assistance and marketing
advice. The reporting of the case study results from a series of projects supported
over a number of years by the UK Department for International Development
Crop Post-Harvest Programme. These projects focused on export horticultural
development in India. The problem of farmer access to high-value mango export
markets remains unsolved and the efforts of Vijaya, APEDA and DFID are still
continuing. However the experience of working on this issue has given many
useful insights into the critical importance of addressing issues of institutional
context, and the way the various stakeholders, including the externally funded
project, have learnt important institutional lessons. The case study documents
this institutional learning process.
Institutional Roles and Arrangements for Technology Support
Agricultural Research
Public sector agricultural research in India is conducted by institutions that can
be categorised into two main organisational groups. In the first group are the
research institutions that fall under the national agricultural research organisa-
tion, the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR). In the second group
are the 29 state agricultural universities (SAU). In addition to these institutions,
and less well-integrated, are non-agricultural universities and other scientific
organisations – notably those under the Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research, the Department of Biotechnology and the Department of Science and
Technology, all of which conduct research related to agriculture. Similarly
under the Ministry of Food there are networks of grain storage research insti-
tutes and sugar research institutes.
All these organisations are collectively described as India’s national agricul-
tural research system. However, from a policy perspective, as well as from a
practical point of view, it is only the ICAR institutions and the SAU that can be
considered as a coherent system. This is mainly a result of the many collabora-
tive All India Coordinated Research Projects that draw on the combined efforts
of the SAUs and the ICAR institutes. In theory, there is nothing preventing link-
ages between public-sector research institutes and related support agencies that
fall under different research councils and different ministerial and departmental
control. In practice, this rarely happens. The consequences of this are discussed
in the case study.
A similar situation is also reflected in the relationship between public sector
research institutes and the private sector. Although agricultural research in
India has been heavily dominated by the public sector for the past 40 years,
over the last decade significant private agricultural research and development
(R&D) capacity has emerged. In part this has been associated with agro-indus-
trial growth in response to new opportunities in the increasingly liberal policy
environment (particularly apparent in the seed industry). However, R&D capac-
really succeeded was
in the institutional
innovations it had put
in place to undertake
development-focused
research, and that this
would underpin
success in the long
run. Key stakeholders,
including the donor,
were reluctant to
accept this as a way
of judging the
project’s success. 
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ity has also emerged in the horticulture and agrochemical sectors. In addition,
there has been growing recognition of the potential importance of the non-profit
private sector (NGOs, farmers associations, and private research foundations) in
undertaking agricultural research and allied activities.
ICAR has recognised the opportunities that such institutional development
can provide, particularly for public/private-sector partnerships. Part of the
reform process that ICAR has implemented over the last five years has been to
address this issue. However progress is modest and to date the range and scope
of public/private-sector partnerships is not as extensive as its potential suggests.
Furthermore it is increasingly apparent that despite efforts to reform the system,
institutional arrangements in ICAR still present a considerable obstacle to better
working relationships between the two sectors (Mruthyunjaya and Pal 1999;
Paroda and Mruthyunjaya 2000). Ways of proceeding to a more institutionally
diverse, stakeholder-driven research system remain a significant challenge4. And
it is not just ICAR that is trying to address these types of issue. Many public-
sector support agencies in India are facing the need to make themselves more
accountable to clients, with the quality of their services coming under the
scrutiny that has accompanied entry into global markets. The case study con-
cerns in part the consequences of this process. To understand the implications of
this it is first useful to give more contextual details of the horticultural sector,
key agencies involved and the way this institutional landscape is starting to
evolve. 
Horticulture 
The Indian Eighth Plan allocation for horticulture sector development increased
from US$ 6 million (Rs24crores) to US$ 250 million (Rs1000crores). This,
coupled with many concessions, subsidies and incentives to producers, was both
an important impetus to growth, as well as recognition of its developmental
potential. At the macroeconomic level, India has created an increasingly liberal
economic policy environment since 1991. This has eased procedures for foreign
collaboration and access to international markets. In turn it has precipitated an
unprecedented expansion in Indian exports, among which horticultural exports
have been important (APEDA 1998). However the sector has not only witnessed
strong growth and policy support. Kaul (1996) comments that the trend
observed since 1991 is that the horticultural sector has gradually moved out of
its rural confines as a traditional agricultural activity into something approach-
ing corporate enterprise. This trend has led to the adoption of improved tech-
nology, greater commercialisation and professionalism in the management of
production and marketing. 
However horticulture in India continues to be troubled by constraints such
as major plant diseases across commodities, low yields compared to other pro-
ducer countries and in particular, poor post-harvest practices. All this leads to
low final product quality. Quality management is thus a major concern for
export marketing where standards are high and punitively enforced. It would
appear therefore that improved productivity, post-harvest management, hybrid
development, and product diversification are all challenges which horticultural
science is to face if it is to continue to play a strategic role in sector develop-
ment. Furthermore, these efforts will need to be supported by an adequate
market infrastructure and policy environment, together with relevant mecha-
4 For comprehensive
discussion of the chal-
lenges facing public
sector agricultural
research in India, see
Mruthyunjaya and
Ranjitha (1998). 
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nisms for articulating the technological needs of producers and processors to sci-
entists, which in turn must be linked to efficient mechanisms for technology
transfer (Kaul 1996). 
Relevant Organisations
The main sources of R&D and technology services related to horticulture fall
under ICAR, the State Agricultural Universities and, in the specific context of
post-harvest and food science, the Central Food Technology Research Institute.
The horticulture-related institutes under ICAR include: 8 Central Research
Institutes, with 27 regional stations, 1 Project Directorate, 10 National Research
Centres, and 7 multi-disciplinary institutes. In addition there are 15 All India
Coordinated Research Projects related to horticulture, with 223 research centres
collaborating in these projects. There is 1 fully-fledged University of Horticulture,
and 24 State Agricultural Universities with horticulture departments. Post-
harvest research, while not a traditional focus, has received greater attention in
recent years. While the SAUs do not have strong post- harvest capability many
of the ICAR institutes have started to develop such capabilities (Ghosh 1998).
These skills range from processing and preserving produce, to developing post-
harvest treatments, to control storage deterioration, and increasing storage life
and shipment duration. 
The institutes related to horticulture are quite numerous and geographically
dispersed throughout the country. While some of these institutes, particularly
the commodity-related ones, have a specific regional relevance, the more the-
matic-focused institutes have a more nationwide relevance. There is considerable
overlap between institutions, particularly in cross-cutting themes such as post-
harvest. With only the recent emergence of private-sector clients, many of the
horticulture-related ICAR institutes have a history of focusing on smallholder
producers as their main clients. As a result, relevant institutes do not have a
long history of working with the corporate enterprise sector. Similarly, with par-
ticipation in export markets recently becoming of importance in the newly liber-
alised policy environment, related expertise is still being developed. It has been
suggested that the future strategy of ICAR in the horticulture sector should
focus on the following three Agricultural Research and Extension Network
Paper No. 111/4 points: (i) the building of research capacity for post-harvest
technologies; (ii) enlarged partnership arrangements with the private sector; and
(iii) the creation of institutional linkages both between different ICAR institutes,
and between ICAR and SAUs (Ghosh 1998). 
For this case study there were several organisations that have played an
important part in the story. It is useful to summarise them at this stage: 
Agricultural Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA):
Established under the Ministry of Commerce, the mandate of APEDA is to build
links between Indian producers and global markets. The organisation was ini-
tially conceived as a marketing/export promotion organisation, providing
exporters with information on market requirements and performing regulatory
functions. All exporters of scheduled products are required by the APEDA Act to
be registered with APEDA. 
However this initial role has broadened to include technical backstopping
(IFW 1996). APEDA lacks the expertise and infrastructure to provide this tech-
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nical backstopping support in-house, and instead sub-contracts these activities.
For example, APEDA set up a Controlled Atmosphere Programme to develop a
protocol for the shipment of mangoes to Europe. This was initially contracted
out to the Indian Institute of Horticultural Research and the Central Food
Technology Research Institute. Similarly in the absence of a dedicated horticul-
tural extension system5, APEDA has played an important role in facilitating the
supply of technical advice to farmers. While the mainstay of these technology-
related activities has used scientists from national (public) scientific research
institutes, APEDA has also sought technical assistance from outside India for the
purchase of equipment; international transport; and the monitoring of fruit on
arrival at export destinations. 
The Indian Institute of Horticultural Research: (IIHR) is an ICAR institute located in
Bangalore in Southern India. Historically, IIHR has been important for
germplasm development of both vegetable species and fruit trees. Its other
strengths have included agronomy and crop protection. IIHR has also under-
taken research on post-harvest processing, but this has focused mainly on
farmer-and cottage-level industry. In common with other ICAR institutes, IIHR
has traditionally had laboratory/field station research mandates and has not
played a major role in extension. Like many ICAR institutes social science exper-
tise in the institute is restricted to economics and statistics, dealing with macro
trends in production and markets. Since 1998, in line with ICAR policy, scien-
tists from IIHR have been able to engage in consulting contracts. IIHR has expe-
rience in certain niche commercial horticultural sectors, but has only more
recently started to engage in the high-value commercial sector and particularly
export markets. Extensive contracting arrangements with private-sector horticul-
tural export companies have yet to emerge6. However since 1995, IIHR has
been contracted extensively by APEDA in connection with developing protocols
for mango exports, including the training of farmers and exporters. 
Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University: State agricultural universities in India are
based on the Land Grant Model from USA. They perform a predominantly teach-
ing and agricultural extension function and undertake adaptive research to
support these activities. Many state agricultural universities have a horticulture
department dealing with crops relevant to a particular state. Of relevance to the
Vijaya case study was the involvement of the Department of Horticulture at the
Andhra Pradesh State Agricultural University (APAU). Scientists provided train-
ing to Vijaya staff, and advisory services for field practice and post-harvest han-
dling. The university also undertook routine analysis of soil samples and health
of farmers’ orchards. (This was a prerequisite for farmers wanting to join the
Vijaya association.) 
The Central Food Technology Research Institute: (CFTRI) is India’s premier food
science research institute. It falls under the Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) and is located in Mysore in Southern India. The original
mandate of the organisation focused on low-cost food processing technology,
utilisation of indigenous raw material, and excellence in food science and food
safety. Clients were originally from cottage-industry food enterprises and large-
scale (often publicly-owned) food industries. More recently the focus has started
5 While district level
horticultural officers
may be posted in
some cases, their
activities are restricted
to the establishment
and management of
horticultural nurseries
for the supply of
seedlings (Rasheed &
Sadamate 2000). 
6 Information provided
in the IIHR Annual
Report 1998–99
(pp. 132–33) suggests
that the majority
(60%) of revenue
raised from
consultancy services
arises from sale of
seeds and breeding
material; the next
most important source
(25%) of revenue
comes from
evaluation of the effi-
cacy of new pesticides
(described as contract
services). Contract
research accounts for
only 6%. The remain-
der is derived from:
conducting national
training courses (5%);
general consultancy
(2%); conducting
international training
courses (1%); and
advisory consultancy
(1%). Total revenue
for 1998–99 was
Rs24,70,866 (US$
62,000) (IIHR 1999). 
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to shift toward corporate private enterprise. Like other CSIR institutes there has
been a move towards cost recovery, and this has shown considerable success in
many CSIR institutes (World Bank 1989). The challenge for organisations like
CFTRI is to be able to maintain their pursuit of scientific excellence, while at the
same time catering to the needs of new and discerning customers, whose
agendas are strictly commercial. In the context of the Vijaya project CFTRI was
contracted to lead the post-harvest component of the work. They were selected
on the basis of their professed expertise in controlled atmosphere technology.
Private-sector organisations 
Private organisations are becoming an increasingly important institutional node
in the Indian horticultural sector. A notable example of this is the grape growers
association of Maharashtra7 and the creation of Mahagrapes, a confederation of
grape-growers societies (Rasheed Sulaiman and Sadamate 2000; Hall et al.
1998). The expanding institutional role of such private organisations, and their
increasingly proactive search for the technology to access new markets presents
important opportunities for partnerships with the public sector. This in turn
could be an important way of linking farmers with the types of public agency
that can facilitate access to new economic opportunities. It should be remem-
bered that private firms still need to rely on small farmers for produce due to
current land tenure arrangements (Haque 2000). However the reality is that
farmers or private entrepreneurs quite often have to contact several agencies for
different requirements. This reflects the poor coordination between agencies
under different ministries and departments. It also reflects the more general
feature of the public-sector agencies and particularly the research institutes; viz.
the tendency to compartmentalise activities along professional lines rather than
on a more system-wide basis. This point is discussed in more detail in the case
study. 
Case Study 
The Vijaya Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association 
The Vijaya Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association (Vijaya) was established in
1992 in Vijayawada in southern Andhra Pradesh, India. The association is
made up of sixteen fruit and vegetable cooperatives (primary societies) spread
over three districts around Vijayawada. The primary society membership con-
sists of approximately 500 farmers who between them cultivate almost 3,000
acres of mangoes. Vijaya acts as an apex organisation to undertake and coordi-
nate the marketing of mangoes in export and high-value domestic markets.
Vijaya is ostensibly a private enterprise established with the initial support of the
Andhra Pradesh State Marketing Department. Vijaya’s specific goal is to find
better prices for farmer members’ produce through direct marketing to high-
value domestic and export markets without the produce being handled by
middle men, wholesalers and traders. 
Vijaya rents pre-cooling and packhouse facilities during the mango season
(April/May) to process the fruit it purchases from farmer members. It identifies
markets, negotiates prices and organises transport/shipment of fruit. Farmers
receive a premium price for fruit that is of export quality. In turn, a key func-
tion of Vijaya is to act as a source of technical advice and inputs to assist
farmers to increase the proportion of fruit which reaches export-quality criteria
7 The full name of the
association is
Maharashtra Rajya
Draksha Bagaitdar
Sangh. Not only has
this organisation
developed new export
markets for its
members, it has also
established
mechanisms for
accessing and supply-
ing the technology
needed to participate
in these markets.
Important here was
the establishment of a
dedicated grape R&D
facility. Furthermore,
this R&D facility pro-
vided a focus for the
establishment of the
relevant ICAR institu-
tion, the National
Research Centre for
Grapes. 
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– initially only ten percent of fruit were attaining this level of quality. Vijaya has
a network of field officers that provide production and post-harvest advice. These
officers supervise the harvesting of mangoes and processing in the packhouse. 
Criteria for membership of the primary cooperative societies are designed to
screen out the largest farmers (those with more than 10 acres of mangoes).
Although these types of equity criteria are understandably difficult to enforce,
households with small land holdings (up to 5 acres) are represented in the mem-
bership of the society. Furthermore, the labour intensive export harvesting pro-
cedures provide a significant source of additional income for the poorest house-
holds. The efforts of Vijaya to develop export markets for its members’ mangoes
have been given significant assistance from APEDA. This has included both pro-
motional and technical assistance. Recognising the importance of forming link-
ages between Vijaya and relevant sources of technical expertise, both nationally
and internationally, APEDA provided 50 percent of the costs of engaging scien-
tists from IIHR, CFTRI and APAU. 
The support that IIHR provided to Vijaya was through this type of contract
arrangement, although it was APEDA that contracted IIHR as part of the export
support role (see discussion below). It is important to highlight that this
arrangement was therefore one public agency contracting another public
agency on behalf of the private marketing organisation (Vijaya). This had signif-
icant implications. The linkage mechanisms associated with Vijaya were exten-
sive and demonstrate the potential dual function of both market and technology
access mechanisms that organisations like Vijaya can provide. As part of the
support that APEDA provided to Vijaya, scientists from the Natural Resources
Institute (NRI) in the UK were encouraged to focus their efforts on critical tech-
nical constraints that Vijaya was facing. The most important of these was the
development of controlled-atmosphere sea-shipment protocols. The origins and
development of NRI involvement with APEDA and the way the series of recent
research projects evolved is worth recounting in some detail. 
The research project 
The origins of the recent research project funded by DFID’s Crop Post-Harvest
Programme (CPHP) can be traced to the activities of the Overseas Development
Natural Resources Institute (later renamed NRI). Between 1993 and 1995 a
series of activities was begun to assist countries with potentially important hor-
ticultural export industries. The activities focused on developing a manual on
Horticultural Export Quality Assurance (HEQA) to help promote the develop-
ment of exports of horticultural produce by improvement of quality and achieve-
ment of market requirements. Driving this was the realisation that horticultural
export industries were a potentially important source of economic development,
held many benefits for small-scale producers, as well as generating important
employment opportunities for the poor in rural areas. 
The HEQA manual was designed to support producers and exporters target-
ing European markets. The purpose of the HEQA manual was to provide a
source of information on European Union legislation (such as pesticide residue
levels, hygiene requirements and protocols to ensure produce could be traced to
the point of origin). Information was also provided on parameters set by the
market (size, shape, colour of fruit, size of consignment, and so forth). The HEQA
manual set out how these parameters could be achieved, providing practical
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information for the development of a total quality management system for han-
dling and export of produce. The manual was validated in Kenya in 1994, but
the main emphasis soon shifted to India. In 1995/ – 96, in collaboration with
APEDA, NRI presented training sessions on horticultural export-quality assur-
ance in India based on the manual. Using the HEQA manual as a template
APEDA went on to develop HEQA for specific commodities, namely grapes,
lychee, kinnow and mangoes, with a view to providing useful and practical
guidance for the establishment of quality assurance procedures by packhouses.
APEDA have developed a scheme that issues a ‘Certificate of Registration of
Premium Quality Exporter’ to packhouses complying with requirements of the
manual. 
Since the mid-1990s APEDA has been promoting the development of the
mango export sector. As such, it had been helping organisations such as Vijaya
access Far East markets using airfreight. However, APEDA realised that in order
to be competitive in European markets, mangoes need to be transported by sea,
as sea transport can accommodate a larger volume of exports than air freight
and offers considerable cost advantages. As a result, APEDA commissioned a
programme of work to develop controlled-atmosphere sea-shipment methods to
extend the storage life of mangoes from harvest to arrival in Europe. In contrast
to the approach based around quality management standards of the HEQA
manual, achieving successful mango exports to Europe was seen as a largely
technological task. Considerable research was required to develop the types of
controlled-atmosphere regimes that would be needed. And these had to be devel-
oped specifically for Indian mangoes and specifically for a minimum post-harvest
life of 30 days. 
Scientists from CFTRI with expertise in post-harvest technologies were com-
missioned by APEDA to undertake the initial work on developing controlled-
atmosphere (CA) protocols (gas and temperature regimes and so forth) as well as
the post-harvest component of export protocol (fruit handling, packaging and
packhouse procedures). The approach was to undertake a number of trial ship-
ments from Andhra Pradesh, using Vijaya as a focus for this activity. At the
same time scientists from IIHR and APAU were commissioned to formulate a set
of pre- and post-harvest protocols to improve export quality. These included: pre-
harvest disease control and tree management; advice on harvest maturity and
fruit selection; improved harvesting practices; handling and packaging protocols.
Once the recommendations had been formulated, CFTRI, IIHR and APAU
trained the staff of Vijaya and provided written advice for Vijaya’s farmer
members. In the following season (1997) trial shipments of mangoes under CA
storage conditions were sent to Europe. The results of the first sea shipment sug-
gested that further work was required on the development of the CA technology. 
Phase One: Technical quality parameters 
The shape of the new project was not just determined by the fact that APEDA
(and Vijaya) viewed the presenting problem as largely technological. Major
changes had also taken place at both NRI and within DFID’s funding mecha-
nisms, resulting in a stronger physical sciences research mandate than the more
developmentally focused initiative of the HEQA manual. This, along with the
personalities involved in the UK team, resulted in APEDA and NRI embarking
on a predominantly technical research project. And since a large part of the
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project was to be done as the thesis work of a doctoral student, the project was
destined to lean towards the theoretical rather than the applied part of the spec-
trum. The project work began in late 1996, with the next sea shipment to take
place in April/May 1997. Initial activities of the NRI scientists focused on trying
to gauge the reasons behind the poor performance of shipments to date and
define the scope of further research needed on the CA protocol. As part of this
process one of the scientists started to examine the whole of the production-har-
vesting-handling chain as a way of getting some idea about the quality of fruit
and the factors affecting fruit in sea-shipment containers. It quickly became
apparent that there was a much larger range of technical problems in the
quality chain than had first been anticipated. Furthermore, discussions with
Vijaya and its farmer members raised concerns over the types of recommenda-
tions being provided, particularly in the context of a predominantly small and
marginal farmer production system. 
The results of the trial shipment of mangoes supported the suggestion that
farmers were having difficulty adopting and implementing the advice that was
being provided by scientists from IIHR and APAU. There were clearly also some
issues concerning the efficacy of the CA sea-shipment protocols that CFTRI had
developed. Furthermore it was apparent that many of the problems observed in
the fruit at the export destination were a combination of field-level disease prob-
lems (particularly anthracnose) made worse by inadequate storage and shipment
conditions. 
Lessons from Phase One 
The different stakeholders, while all recognising that there was a problem,
defined it in different ways. Vijaya felt unhappy with the technical content and
appropriateness of the advice it was receiving. However it appeared to be unable
to leverage any improvements. Neither did Vijaya take issue with the rather pre-
scriptive approach to providing recommendations to its farmers. APEDA viewed
the problem as mainly an issue of the intensity of the technical backstopping,
although it also realised the need to take a more proactive approach in manag-
ing the technical components that had been subcontracted to IIHR and CFTRI.
APEDA then responded in two ways. Firstly, it contracted scientists from NRI to
undertake further out-turn assessments in order to monitor the technical valid-
ity of the protocols and practices being developed. Secondly, it intensified farmer-
training efforts in mango-growing areas by devising a more intensive training
programme that covered both pre-harvest and post-harvest issues and took an
active role in coordinating these efforts (although this was not implemented
until 1999). 
The NRI scientists also recognised that while there was a strong technology
dimension to the problem there were a number of facets to this. Firstly, export
quality would only be achieved if the production, handling and CA sea-shipment
components were dealt with in an integrated fashion. The different problem
areas were strongly interrelated and a technical solution would only be relevant
in a ‘total systems’ perspective. In contrast, technical assistance was being pro-
vided in component form. Secondly, it was clear that there were a number of
process problems with the way technical backstopping was being provided. So
while many of the quality issues needed to be addressed with (often location-spe-
cific) adaptive research, the assistance provided tended to be preformulated.
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Furthermore, this related to the professional traditions of the institutes providing
field level technical backstopping, as well as the limited resources and incentives
available for field visits under the terms of the contract. 
The technical support provided to Vijaya was suffering from a number of sig-
nificant institutional constraints. Since NRI was itself only contributing certain
components as part of an overall cluster of technical support initiatives, it was
difficult to see how this could succeed if the overall cluster was not working in
a systemic fashion. While Vijaya and APEDA were keen to continue with the
project, it was clear that a technical solution alone was not going to solve this
type of issue. At this point, and hastened by the departure of the principle inves-
tigator from the UK team, DFID’s CPHP decided not to take the project forward
in its original form. Residual money in the first year’s budget was used to review
the extent that organisations like Vijaya were playing a role in linking farmers
with markets and technologies. This tended to confirm that important develop-
ments were taking place with private organisations playing a potential brokering
role. However, technical backstopping of these efforts by various public agencies
left much to be desired (Hall et al. 1998). It must be emphasised that the scien-
tists themselves were not at fault, rather it was the institutional environment
they came from and the restrictions this placed on their professional experience
and mandate. Closer examination of the organisational and institutional context
of the technical support was clearly needed. 
Phase Two: Technology development and institutional analysis 
The second phase of the project took these ideas regarding the institutional envi-
ronment forward in the form of a pilot action research project, which entailed
undertaking a further piece of technical research with Vijaya. This was used as
a vehicle to understand the institutional constraints presenting among relevant
public agencies; the way these constraints impinged in a practical sense on
attempts to solve technical problems; and to identify possible ways of moving
forward. The point here is that the design of the second-phase project explicitly
recognised the need to understand technical issues in terms of the institutional
context associated with ways of addressing the problem. The findings that this
approach produced reveal a set of institutional constraints that, in broad terms,
are widely recognised and documented problems encountered with public-sector
agricultural research institutes in India, as well as around the world8. 
Lessons from Phase Two 
While the project as a whole learnt a number of lessons from the Phase 2 activ-
ities, each of the stakeholders probably learnt less. After all, they still saw the
problem in broadly technical terms and while aware of the constraints that the
institutional environment imposed, they viewed it as a fixed parameter about
which little could be done. While in one sense this was correct, was there room
for manoeuvre? One of the lessons that emerged from both Phase 1 and Phase
2 of the project was that the experiences of Vijaya were not unique: attempts to
access technology from public-sector research institutes form part of more wide-
spread institutional changes related to the growth of the private sector in agri-
cultural/horticultural development. In the case of corporate enterprises and
some grower associations, dissatisfaction with public services had encouraged a
8 For general critique
see Biggs and Clay
(1981), Biggs (1990),
Chambers and Jiggins
(1987 a & b), Byerlee
(1998), Hall et al.
(2000). For country
studies see: for India,
Farrington et al.
(1998), Hall et al.
(2001, in press (a)),
for Thailand, Hall and
Clark (1995) for
Uganda see Hall and
Nhady (1999). 
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diverse range of technology acquisition strategies, including the establishment of
independent R&D facilities. 
The lesson here was that, despite the problems faced by Vijaya, alternative
institutional groupings held the promise of an operational technology system –
at least potentially. Furthermore, it was felt that alternative and multiple part-
ners might represent a more effective model than the traditional donor-funded
research model where one group of public-sector scientists from the interna-
tional research community is linked with another set in a developing country.
Important here was the finding that (diverse) partnerships strengthen the stake-
holding of interest groups other than scientists, and this helps create and opera-
tionalise new technology9. The way this finding has been acted upon is dis-
cussed below under the Phase 3 project. 
The second lesson relates directly to Vijaya. It concerns the fact that given
the resources available to Vijaya (and there must be many organisations like it
in India), its technology acquisition strategies are probably limited to those it
can access from public agencies within the country. While this reiterates the
urgent need for policy reform in public agencies, what options does it leave open
to Vijaya? The second phase project had also provided a number of lessons
about the institutional role and capability of Vijaya, specifically the way institu-
tional capacity had limited its ability to enforce accountability standards on the
types of technical assistance it was receiving. This related to the way one public
agency was providing assistance to a private organisation by contracting
directly another public agency. However even under direct contracting arrange-
ments, it is doubtful whether Vijaya would have been able to enforce improved
service delivery. This was because Vijaya did not recognise the systemic nature
of the quality management issue, and therefore the need for an integrated
approach to problem solving. Furthermore it did not recognise that the process
by which technical advice and services were delivered to farmers had enormous
implications for the effectiveness of any programme of technical support.
Important here is the recognition that if organisations like Vijaya are to become
important and useful nodes in a technology system, they need the capabilities to
perform this role. In the Indian context this means the technical and manager-
ial skill to enforce accountability in technology service provision and the ability
to do so, bearing in mind the stringent requirements of export markets and
resource constraints of farmer members. 
Phase Three: Combined technology and institutional learning pro-
tocols 
The lessons from the second phase of the project affected not only the design of
the third phase project but also the overall DFID Crop Post-Harvest Programme
strategy for projects in South Asia10. The third phase of the project concerns
undertaking adaptive action research with Vijaya and APEDA to develop man-
agement systems that will allow Vijaya to better access technology suitable for a
smallholder production context. In this sense the project has shifted from its
initial emphasis on a technical fix, to one of understanding and developing ways
to strengthen the institutional role and capability of Vijaya. The project will
allow it to operate more effectively within the overall institutional context of
public-sector support agencies in India. The project was commissioned in late
1999 with the same NRI team and has been operating for one year at the time
9 These types of finding
from the Phase 1 and
Phase 2 projects are
discussed in detail in
Hall et al. (2001, in
press b). 
10 The CPHP developed
a regional strategy
designed to both
understand and
address the problems
contained in the insti-
tutional environment.
In part this concerned
adopting an approach
to test out the viabil-
ity of alternative
institutional groups,
breaking with the pre-
vious tradition of
choosing
predominantly public-
sector research
institutions as the pri-
mary in-country
collaborators. Rather,
DFID’s CPHP
attempted to develop
a portfolio of projects
with contrasting insti-
tutional frameworks,
with the understand-
ing these would in
one respect represent
institutional
experiments, and that
learning institutional
lessons would be an
explicit agenda.
Operationally this was
achieved by commis-
sioning a cluster of
technical projects, but
with issues of institu-
tional diversity seen
as an important crite-
rion for project
development and
selection. To facilitate
lesson learning, an
umbrella policy
research project was
put in place with a
view to gaining a
thorough understand-
ing of the institutional
issues, presenting and
using the individual
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of writing. In practical terms the project involves the development of a manual
that will assist organisations working with smallholder producers to access more
effectively scientific resources and bring these to bear on those pre- and post-
harvest constraints which are preventing market access (Taylor 1999). APEDA
and Vijaya continue to form the focus of this work. However it is probably fair
to say that their interest initially lay in the technical content of the manual to
be produced, rather than the combined institutional agenda. 
The out-turn assessments of the earlier phases continued in Phase 3.
However the result of the assessments at the export destinations showed that
the mango consignments had achieved the lowest rates of success to date. The
consignment from Vijaya was a total failure, with the mangoes being rejected by
the importer on arrival. APEDA and Vijaya were both extremely disappointed
with the results feeling that they had progressed very little since their first ship-
ments five years previously. The reason behind the failure was initially identified
as poor maintenance of a cool chain, most critically a delay of 24 hours of the
sea-shipment containers on the dock in high temperature before leaving India.
While these factors undoubtedly contributed to the failure, if the mangoes had
been first-class, disease-free fruit, picked at the correct level of maturity, cor-
rectly handled and packed, the effect of the delay at the dock would not have
been critical. In other words it was not that one element of the chain failed,
rather that stress at one point highlighted the weakness in the whole chain of
procedures all the way from tree management to packhouse practice. Clearly the
problem was not only technical, but also managerial. In other words it was a
systemic problem, and needed to be addressed as such. 
The positive outcome has been that APEDA and Vijay have learnt, albeit
through a rather painful process, that they need to think more systemically
about the technical and managerial issues associated with mango production.
And inevitably this requires a lot more thought about existing institutional
mechanisms for supplying technical backstopping to mango producers. The
project hopes to address this by starting with a pilot training programme that
contains an explicit monitoring element. This will build on the systems learning
approaches that have been found to be so useful in the earlier phases of the
project. It is envisaged that this will create opportunities for all stakeholders to
reflect on the training process and not just technical content and geographic
coverage. This is a modest step towards helping farmers export mangoes to
lucrative markets. However it appears that all concerned are now making
explicit efforts to learn the institutional lesson that will underpin future success. 
Discussion
What lessons does this case tell us? Returning to our earlier discussion of inno-
vation systems, it is clear that what we are seeing is the interaction of two iso-
morphic systems – one economic and the other technical. In the economic sense
the successful production and sale of export-quality mangoes comprises a supply
chain of considerable complexity where each task is highly dependent on the
successful outcomes of related production stages. And in turn this means that
the central enterprise (in this case Vijaya) should have the managerial ability to
understand the overall picture and to have procedures in place to troubleshoot
where things are going wrong. This does not mean that it carries within its
organisation complete expertise relating to each stage. But it does mean that it
technical projects in
the portfolio as case
studies of alternative
arrangements. The
third phase of the
mango project
emerged as one of
those projects. 
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has the capacity to deal effectively with whatever problems arise through
buying in this expertise where necessary from other complementary nodes in
the innovation system. This paper has shown that there have been managerial
shortcomings here. 
More significant perhaps, however, is the apparent inability of all stakehold-
ers to grasp the significance of the technological system that underscores suc-
cessful production and sale. Here the implicit assumption was that any technical
problem could be dealt with in isolation from everything else and that the rele-
vant knowledge could be accessed from some easily identifiable source. And
even when it became abundantly clear that this was not the case, it has proved
remarkably hard to persuade the stakeholders of the true lacuna. It was initially
assumed that the issue was a narrowly technical one and could therefore be
handled by deploying appropriate personnel, yet it only slowly began to dawn
on staff that the issue was really much wider and required the ability to see the
technical problem in holistic terms across different stages of the supply chain. In
this case a clear lesson is the necessary complementarity between pre-harvest
and post-harvest activity. 
In other words it is evident that the successful production, distribution, mar-
keting and export of mangoes in India has to be seen as a total systems activity
where ultimate success depends on the effective interaction of each component
node. Had that appreciation been there at an early stage it is likely that the
interventions would have been much more successful, saving considerable
resources (both public and private). In terms of our earlier discussion, an agri-
cultural innovation system is starting to emerge in response to new markets,
incorporating new players and new capabilities. But public agencies, particularly
scientific research institutes, are clearly having problems relating to this type of
development. Two major operational reasons for this can be identified. First are
the deeply held beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how it should be
sought, validated and disseminated; expertise is seen in highly reductionist terms
where scientists are taught and encouraged to think in narrow disciplinary
terms about problems and solutions. The second reason is the perceived vested
interests that existing institutions have. The two reasons are interrelated of
course since threats to expertise inevitably lead to denial and inward-looking
behaviour on the part of threatened organisations and their managerial struc-
tures. 
An outcome of this situation was the inability to benefit from institutional
learning. As our case study demonstrates only too well, despite the weak perfor-
mance of the technical quality management system and the obvious institu-
tional dimensions of this problem, the key stakeholders continued to view the
problem in technological terms. The realisation of the systemic nature of the
problem and the institutional implications of this has been very slow and only
really prompted by the total failure of last year’s consignments. A clear lesson
here for public policy more generally is the need to embrace institutional learn-
ing much more explicitly. Without institutional learning, institutional structures
designed decades previously will become increasingly irrelevant to the demands
of the modern economy and the developmental opportunities it presents.
Globalisation makes this doubly important. 
The practical steps needed to stimulate institutional learning are extremely
difficult to formulate in the absence of a significant change in the incentives and
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sanctions that come to bear on public-sector research institutions and their sci-
entists. Again, partially this relates to the implicit denial that the linear module
of technical backstopping is not appropriate. This is all too evident from the con-
tinued reliance on performance indicators such as number of farmers and exten-
sion workers trained, number of interactions and linkages between stakeholders
and so forth, without any consideration of the functional consequences of these
events. Some way has to be found to sensitise scientists and administrators to
the importance of institutional learning. In the longer term it needs to be
embodied in the professional toolbox of all scientists, suggesting that amend-
ments are needed to the way agricultural science is taught at the graduate and
undergraduate levels. Competitive grant schemes offer another way of bringing
pressure to bear on research procedures, although such schemes are not
without their own institutional problems. Perhaps in the short term the best
that can be done is to continue to build a body of empirical evidence through
case studies in order to demonstrate the importance of institutional contexts and
the practical implications of learning institutional lessons. 
For the donor and international research community perspective, what are
the implications for the future agenda of agricultural science research projects?
A simple lesson is to make institutional learning an explicit output of projects
and to ensure that projects are designed with cognisance of the particular insti-
tutional environment in which their technical solution will be put into opera-
tion. A related aspect is that institutional innovations will be increasingly impor-
tant as a complementary activity – and even a prerequisite – for technical
change. This is implicit in recent thinking on poverty and development – for
example, the livelihoods framework with its emphasis on institutions as trans-
forming structures (Carney 1998). 
Of greater significance, however, are lessons concerning the proper institu-
tional role of agricultural science research projects, and by implication the
proper institutional role of the international research community and the donors
that support it. If the Vijaya case is representative, the role of project funding
needs to shift from providing narrow technical solutions alone, to projects that
provide lessons which allow nodal organisations to play a more useful role
within the wider innovation system. In other words, the emphasis will shift to
developing the effectiveness of technology systems as a whole. Technical inputs
and competencies will still be important for projects to be able to devise such
lessons. However agricultural science and technology will need to be embedded
in a more inclusive process that requires wider stakeholder participation and, in
particular, a large element of institutional awareness and learning. 
Conclusions
Using a case study that has had a significant donor technical cooperation com-
ponent, this paper has argued that attempts to separate technical and socio-eco-
nomic interventions – and to do so without an analysis of the institutional
context – represents a highly inefficient procedure. By inefficient we mean in the
formal economic sense that considerable resources are wasted. In the Vijaya
case not only were technical interventions relatively unsuccessful over a number
of years but a potentially valuable enterprise designed to enfranchise poor
farmers thereby failed to capture benefits that could well have had considerable
developmental outcomes. In addition, the evidence shows quite clearly that the
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main problem has been an institutional one. The paper therefore suggests that
henceforth policy analysis for agricultural development should specifically aim to
include institutional reform as part and parcel of its recommendations. In addi-
tion, project aid must include policy analysis of likely outcomes as an integral
component of research design. In this way technical aid may begin at last to
have a sustainable impact on developmental possibilities for the world’s poor. 
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